Privacy is one of the most important properties that an information system must satisfy. In these systems, there is a need to share information among different, not trusted entities, and the protection of sensible information has a relevant role. A relatively new trend shows that classical access control techniques are not sufficient to guarantee privacy preserving when data mining techniques are used in a malicious way. Privacy preserving data mining algorithms have been recently introduced with the aim of preventing the discovery of sensible information. In this paper, we propose a modification to privacy preserving association rule mining algorithm on distributed homogenous database. Our algorithm is faster, privacy preserving and provides accurate results. The flexibility for extension to any number of sites can be achieved without any change in the implementation. Also any increase in number of these sites does not add more time overhead, because all client sites perform the mining process in the same time so the overhead is in communication time only. Finally, the total bit-communication cost for our algorithm is function in (N) sites.
Introduction
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) is an important property that any data mining system needs to satisfy. So far, if we assumed that the information in each database found in data mining can be freely shared, then there is now an increasing need for computing association rules across databases belonging to sites, in such a way that no more information than necessary is revealed from each database to the other databases, that only every site knows its input and final mining results. This need is driven by several trends like security, government agencies need to share information for devising effective security measures, within the same government and across governments. However, an agency cannot indiscriminately open up its database to all other agencies. Also privacy, privacy legislation and stated privacy policies place limits on information sharing. However, it is still desirable to mine across databases while respecting privacy limits.
In our society the privacy term is overloaded, and can, in general, assume a wide range of different meanings. For example, in the context of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rule, privacy means the individual's ability to control who has the access to personal health care information. From the organisations point of view, privacy involves the definition of policies stating which information is collected, how it is used, and how customers are informed and involved in this process. Moreover, there are many other definitions of privacy that are generally related with the particular environment in which the privacy has to be guaranteed. Still needed a more generic definition, which can be instantiated to different environments and situations. From a philosophical point of view, in Schoeman (1984) and Walters (2001) identify three possible definitions of privacy. The first is "privacy as the right of a person to determine which personal information about him/her self may be communicated to others". The second is "privacy as the control over access to information about oneself". And the third is "privacy as limited access to a person and to all the features related to the person". In the three definitions, what is interesting from our point of view is the concept of 'controlled information release'. From this idea, a definition of privacy that is more related with our target could be the following: "the right of an individual to be secure from unauthorised disclosure of information about oneself that is contained in an electronic repository". Performing a final tuning of the definition, considering privacy as "the right of an entity to be secure from unauthorised disclosure of sensible information that are contained in an electronic repository or that can be derived as aggregate and complex information from data stored in an electronic repository". The last generalisation is due to the fact that the concept of individual privacy does not even exist.
There are many methods for privacy preserving distributed association rule mining across private databases. So these methods try to compute the answer to the mining without revealing any additional information about user privacy. An application that needs privacy preserving distributed association rule mining across private databases, like medical research; imagine a future where many people have their DNA sequenced. A medical researcher wants to validate a hypothesis connecting a DNA sequence D with a reaction to drug G. People who have taken the drug are partitioned into four groups, based on whether or not they had an adverse reaction and whether or not their DNA contained the specific sequence; the researcher needs the information about drug effectiveness on people in each group. DNA sequences and medical histories are stored in databases in autonomous enterprises. Due to privacy concerns, the enterprises do not wish to provide any information about an individual's DNA sequence or medical history, but still wish to help with the research to mine the databases for some pattern help in drug industry. We want the property that the researcher should get to know the association rules about data and nothing else, and any enterprise should not learn any new information about any individual from other enterprise. There are some existing techniques that one might use for building this application, but they are inadequate related to some disadvantages.
In this paper we addresses the problem of computing association rules when databases belonging to sites and each site needs preserving the privacy of users data in databases. We assume homogeneous databases: All sites have the same schema, but each site has information on different entities. The goal is to produce a modification to algorithm in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) that computes association rules that hold globally while limiting the information shared about each site in order to increase the efficiency of the algorithm. The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview about the problem and the related work in the area of privacy preserving association rule mining on distributed homogenous databases. In Section 3, the details of the modification for the algorithm of computing the distributed association rule mining to preserve the privacy of users. Sections 4 and 5 describe implementation and results of our new algorithm verse the old algorithm. Finally, some conclusions are put forward in Section 6.
Distributed association rule mining problem and related work
Association Rule mining is one of the most important data mining tools used in many real life applications. It is used to reveal unexpected relationships in the data. In this section, we will discuss the problem of computing association rules within a horizontally partitioned database. We assume homogeneous databases. All sites have the same schema, but each site has information on different entities. The goal is to produce association rules that hold globally, while limiting the information shared about each site to preserve the privacy of data in each site.
Association rule mining
Association rule mining finds interesting associations and/or correlation relationships among large sets of data items. Association rules show attributes value conditions that occur frequently together in a given dataset. A typical and widely-used example of association rule mining is market basket analysis. For example, data are collected using barcode scanners in supermarkets. Such market basket databases consist of a large number of transaction records. Each record lists all items bought by a customer on a single purchase transaction. Managers would be interested to know if certain groups of items are consistently purchased together. They could use this data for adjusting store layouts (placing items optimally with respect to each other), for cross-selling, for promotions, for catalog design and to identify customer segments based on buying patterns.
Association rules provide information of this type in the form of 'if-then' statements. These rules are computed from the data and, unlike the if-then rules of logic, association rules are probabilistic in nature. In association analysis the antecedent and consequent are sets of items (called item-sets) that are disjoint (do not have any items in common). In addition to the antecedent ('if' part) and the consequent ('then' part), an association rule has two numbers that express the degree of uncertainty about the rule. The first number is called the support for the rule. The support is simply the number of transactions that include all items in the antecedent and consequent parts of the rule (the support is sometimes expressed as a percentage of the total number of records in the database). The other number is known as the confidence of the rule. Confidence is the ratio of the number of transactions that include all items in the consequent as well as the antecedent (namely, the support) to the number of transactions that include all items in the antecedent.
In Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) the association rules mining problem can formally be defined as follows: Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i n } be a set of items. Let DB be a set of transactions, where each transaction T is an itemset such that T ⊆ I. Given an itemset A ⊆ I, a transaction T contains A if and only if A ⊆ T. An association rule is an implication of the form A ⇒ Y where A ⊆ I, B ⊆ I and A ∩ B = ∅ . The rule A ⇒ B has support S in the transaction database DB if S% of transactions in DB contains A ∪ B. The association rule holds in the transaction database DB with confidence C if C% of transactions in DB that contain A also contains B. An itemset X with k items is called a k-itemset.
Distributed association rule mining problem
The problem of mining association rules is to find all rules whose support and confidence are higher than certain user specified minimum support and confidence. Clearly, computing association rules without disclosing individual transactions is straightforward. We can compute the global support and confidence of an association rule AB ⇒ C knowing only the local supports of AB and ABC, and the size of each database: 
Note that this requires no sharing of any individual transactions. And protects individual data privacy, but it does require that each site disclose what rules it supports, and how much it supports each potential global rule. What if this information is sensitive? Clearly, such an approach will be secure under secure muti-party computation (SMC) definitions by some modification, a way to convert the above simple distributed method to a secure method in SMC model is to use secure summation and comparison methods to check whether threshold are satisfied for every potential itemset. For example, for every possible candidate 1-itemset, we can use the secure summation and comparison protocol to check whether the threshold is satisfied. Figure 2 gives an example of testing if itemset ABC is globally supported. Each site first computes its local support for ABC, or specifically the number of itemsets by which its support exceeds the minimum support threshold (which may be negative). The parties then use the secure summation algorithm (the first site adds a random (R) to its local excess support, then passes it to the next site to add its excess support, etc. and finally when pass to first site subtract the generated random from the result). The only change is the final step, the last site performs a secure comparison with the first site to see if the sum ≥ R. In the example, R-10 is passed to the second site, which adds its excess support (5) and passes it to site 3. Site 3 adds its excess support; the resulting value (22) is tested using secure comparison to see if it exceeds the random value (21). It is, so itemsets ABC is supported globally.
Due to huge number of potential candidate itemsets, we need to have a more efficient method. This can be done by observing this lemma, (if a rule has support > k% globally, it must have support > k% on at least one of the individual sites). A distributed algorithm for this would work as follows, request that all rules are sent by each site with support at least k, for each rule returned, request that all sites send the count for their transactions that support the rule, and the total count of all transactions at the site. From this, we can compute the global support of each rule, and be certain that all rules with support at least k have been found. This has been shown to be an effective pruning technique.
In order to use the above lemma, we need to compute the union of locally large sets. Then use the secure summation and comparison only on the candidate itemsets contained in the union. Revealing candidate itemsets means that the algorithm is no longer fully secure: itemsets that are large at one site, but not globally large, would not be disclosed by a fully secure algorithm. However, by computing the union securely, we prevent disclosure of which site, or even how many sites, support a particular itemset. This release of innocuous information (included in the final result) enables a completely secure algorithm that approaches the efficiency of insecure distributed association rule mining algorithms. The function now being computed reveals more information than the original association rule mining function. However, the key is that we have provable limits on what is disclosed.
Related work
One of the techniques that used to PPDM is use of trusted third party. The main parties give the data to a 'trusted' third party and have the third party do the computation (Agrawal and Srikant, 1994) . However, the third party has to be completely trusted, both with respect to intent and competence against security breaches. The level of trust required is too high for this solution to be acceptable.
Data perturbation technique has different idea, the idea is that the distorted data does not reveal private information, and thus is 'safe' to use for mining. The key result is that the distorted data, and information on the distribution of the random data used to distort the data, can be used to generate an approximation to the original data distribution, without revealing the original data values. The distribution is used to improve mining results over mining the distorted data directly, primarily through selection of split points to 'bin' continuous data. Later refinement of this approach tightened the bounds on what private information is disclosed, by showing that the ability to reconstruct the distribution can be used to tighten estimates of original values based on the distorted data (Ajmani et al., 2001 ). Another approach is secure multi-party computation. In this approach given two parties with inputs x and y respectively, the goal of secure multi-party computation is to compute a function f(x, y) such that the two parties learn only f(x, y), and nothing else. In Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) there are various approaches to this problem.
In Goldreich (2002) an efficient protocol for Yao's millionaires' problem showed that any multi-party computation can be solved by building a combinatorial circuit, and simulating that circuit. A variant of Yao's protocol is presented in Ioannidis and Grama (2003) where the oblivious transfers is used to make secure decision tree learning using ID3 with efficient cryptographic protocol and their also two solution of our problem under the secure multi party computation for association rule mining (Lindell and Pinkas, 2002; Kantarcioglu and Clifton, 2004) . Figure 1 summarises the methods for privacy preserving association rule mining discussed above. One protocol to securely compute a union is to directly apply secure circuit evaluation as follows: for each possible large k-itemset, each site can create a 0/1 vector such that if the ith itemset is locally supported at the site, it will set the ith bit of its vector to 1 otherwise it will set it to 0. Let's denote this vector as vj for site j and let v j (i) be the ith bit of this vector. All the itemsets are arranged according to lexicographic order. Now for any given itemset, we can find its index i, and evaluate n j=1 j V v (i) where V is the OR gate.
Assuming that we use a secure generic circuit evaluation for OR gate (V), the above protocol is secure and reveals nothing other than the set union result. However expensive circuit evaluation is needed for each potential large k-itemset. This secure method does not use the fact that local pruning eliminates some part of the large itemsets.
In Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) an explanation of a much more efficient method for this problem is described. Although this method reveals a little more information than the above protocol, a precise description of what is revealed is given, and they prove that nothing else is revealed. To obtain an efficient solution without revealing what each site supports, they instead exchange locally large itemsets in a way that obscures the source of each itemset. They assume a secure commutative encryption algorithm with negligible collision probability. Intuitively, under commutative encryption, the order of encryption does not matter. If a plaintext message is encrypted by two different keys in a different order, it will be mapped to the same cipher text. Formally, commutatively ensures that E k1 (E k2 (x)) = E k2 (E k1 (x)). The main idea is that each site encrypts the locally supported itemsets, along with enough 'fake' itemsets to hide the actual number supported. Each site then encrypts the itemsets from other sites.
An example illustrates the protocol in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) is given in Figure 3 . Using commutative encryption, each party encrypts its own frequent itemsets (e.g., Site 1 encrypts itemset ABC). The encrypted itemsets are then passed to other parties, until all parties have encrypted all itemsets. These are passed to a common party to eliminate duplicates, and to begin decryption (In Figure 3 , the full set of itemsets is shown to the left of Site 1, after Site 1 decrypts). Then this set is passed to each party, and each party decrypts each itemset. The final result is the common itemsets (ABC and ABD in Figure 3) , an approach to proof that protocol preserves privacy can be found in Goldreich (2002) . This approach to prove that algorithm reveals only the union of locally large itemsets and a clearly bounded set of innocuous information. Figure 3 Steps needed for computing the algorithm Source: Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) Other method in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) showed that the protocol in Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) employs commutative encryption algorithm so it adds large overhead to the mining process then another protocol improves this by applying a public-key cryptosystem algorithm on horizontally partitioned data among three or more parties. In this protocol, the parties can share the union of their data without the need for an outside trusted party. Each party works locally finding all local frequent itemsets of all sizes. Then use public key cryptography to find the union of a frequent local itemset. We find that this method reduce the number of steps from six to four to calculate the global candidate item sets as shown in Figure 4 where K1 is private key and k2 public key . In Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) the results showed that this improvement reduces the time of mining process compared to method in Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) . As before we say that the protocol in Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) employs commutative encryption algorithm, so it adds large overhead to the mining process and protocol in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) improves this by applying a public-key cryptosystem. We can enhance the method in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) by first rearranged the path to compute the protocol as shown in Figure 5 . This can be done by first making two of parties in protocol (one as data mining combiner and one as protocol initiator) and other parties as clients for data mining combiner. This will reduce communication in computing the protocol because firstly communication take time longer than local mining and secondly instead of using two rounds (one round for compute global frequent item sets and one round for compute global support ) we use only one round for computing frequent item sets and global support. Finally improve the time of running data mining algorithm by using apriori-Tid (Cheung et al., 1996a) instead of standard apriori. This based on tree structure to compute the mining results. Therefore the mining algorithm takes less time than other because it makes less number of scan over the data to make the mining results. Step 1 all local data mining (LDM) compute the mining results using fast distributed mining (FDM) of association rules (Cheung et al., 1996a) as locally large k-item sets [LLi(k)] and local support for each item set in LLi(k) then Encrypt frequent item sets and support [LLei(k)] then send it to the data mining combiner.
Step 2 the combiner merge all received frequent items and supports with the data mining combiner frequent items and support in encrypted form then send LLe(k) to algorithm initiator to compute the global association rules.
Step3 the algorithm initiator receives the frequent items with support encrypted. The initiator first decrypt it, then merges it with his LDM result to obtain global mining results L(k), then compute global association rules and distribute it to all protocol parties. The protocol details of our algorithm as in Figure 6 . for each X ∈ LL e (k) do (Kantarcioglu and Clifton, 2004) (step1 and step2) for each X ∈ LLi(k) do compute local support for X
LL(k) = D(LL e (k)) end for generate LLi(k) as in FDM algorithm

end for eliminates duplicates from the LL(k) and LLi(k) compute L(k) from LL(k) and LL i (k) compute association rules with minimum confidence from L(k) and global support of each item in L(k) and broadcast the results.
Our method reduces the number of steps from four steps to only three steps for any numbers of clients to calculate the global candidate item sets. An example of our protocol is shown in Figure 7 where K1 is private key and k2 public key generated by the algorithm in Cheung et al. (1996b) . For the two party cases we can use the protocol without computing global support as above but we use the same method of computing global support as list in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) . Proofing that our algorithm preserves the privacy can be done by using the idea of simulating every thing during the protocol running to know what data every site see in running the protocol (Goldreich, 2002) . The proof as following:
Step 1: every site do LDM and encrypt the LLi(k) with its local support and send to data mining combiner so in LDM there is no communication between client sites and results are encrypted and data mining combiner do not have the private key then no privacy loss.
• In Step 2: data mining combiner mix all LLei(k) with his LLei(k) and send it to protocol initiator so because the results of LDM mixed then the initiator cannot connect between any data and corresponding site then no privacy loss in this step.
• In Step 3: finally the initiator computes the final L(k) and publishes the final association rules and any site cannot deduce from it any information about others. So this protocol cannot loss the privacy in the semi honest model and for malicious model the collision found if the initiator and combiner collude with each other and because we choose the initiator and combiner every time running the protocol so we have negligible collision in our protocol.
Modified algorithm is based on a semi-honest model with negligible collision probability. We assume that all parties in the protocol do not try to provide false information to others (semi-honest model) and the probability of two sites collide with each other is small so it is considered negligible (negligible collision probability).
Evaluation metrics
For a better understanding of PPDM related metrics (Bertino et al., 2005) , we next identify a proper set of criteria and the related benchmarks for evaluating PPDM algorithms. We then adopt these criteria to categorise the metrics. The concept of 'privacy' is defined in introduction section, and the general goals of a PPDM algorithm needed to be clear as follow.
As in Oliveira and Zaiane (2004) can be considering two main scenarios. The first is the case of a medical database where there is the need to provide information about diseases while preserving the patient identity. Another scenario is the classical 'market basket' database, where the transactions related to different client purchases are stored and from which it is possible to extract some information in form of association rules like "if a client buys a product X, he/she will purchase also Z with y% probability". The first is an example where individual privacy has to be ensured by protecting from unauthorised disclosure sensitive information in form of specific data items related to specific individuals. The second one, instead, emphasises how not only the raw data contained into a database must be protected, but also, in some cases, the high level information that can be derived from non-sensible raw data need to protected. Such a scenario justifies the final generalisation of our privacy definition. In the light of these considerations, it is; now, easy to define which are the main goals a PPDM algorithm should enforce: 1 a PPDM algorithm should have to prevent the discovery of sensible information 2 it should be resistant to the various data mining techniques 3 it should not compromise the access and the use of non-sensitive data 4 it should not have an exponential computational complexity.
Correspondingly, identifying the following set of criteria based on which a PPDM algorithm can be evaluated. Privacy level offered by a privacy preserving technique, which indicates how closely the sensitive information, that has been hidden, can still be estimated. Hiding failure, that is, the portion of sensitive information that is not hidden by the application of a privacy preservation technique. Data quality after the application of a privacy preserving technique, considered both as the quality of data themselves and the quality of the data mining results after the hiding strategy is applied. Complexity, which is the ability of a privacy preserving algorithm to execute with good performance in terms of all the resources implied by the algorithm.
We will consider computation time and communication time for complexity metrics and rule quality for data quality metric. For measuring the performance of our method we use communication and computation costs as performance metrics. Cost estimation for association rule mining using the method we have presented can be computed as following: The number of sites is N. Let the total number of locally large itemsets be |LLi(k)|, and the number of that can be directly generated by the globally large (k) itemsets be L(k). Let t be the number of bits in the output of the encryption of an itemset. A lower bound on t is log 2 (|L(k)|); based on current encryption standards t = 512 is a more appropriate value. The total bit-communication cost for the protocol is O(t 2 *|L(k)|* N) where L(k) is closer to UiLLei(k) and t is the number of bits in the encryption key. For comparison, the FDM algorithm requires O(t*|[UiLLi(k)|*N) for the corresponding to steps needed to perform distributed association rule mining. The algorithm in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) To measure the rule quality, in Oliveira and Zaiane (2004) measuring the quality of data which a privacy preserving algorithm is applied is closely related to the information loss resulting from changing the original data when applying the new algorithm. This measure used to know that if modification affects the quality of the results of mining. In modified algorithm no change made in original data. All we make is encrypting the data in all sites. Then collect it with protocol combiner and initiator. During the protocol we merge the data with each other without affecting it and finally we decrypt this data to make the mining. The original data is returned again with no modification. The mining results now same as if we do not make any change in the distributed mining algorithm (Cheung et al., 1996a) . By this proof we say that our algorithm does not loss the accuracy of results and information loss is close to zero.
Implementation of proposed method
We implement our new method and algorithm in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) using java. Because the distributed association rules mining need the mining run in more than one site, we can use the RMI (remote method invocation) to connect the sites with each other. Our application is two parts one name server and other is client so we have two site works as server. First is the protocol initiator and second is the data mining combiner and we need client for every participant in the protocol. The initiator is responsible of the threshold of the mining algorithm so it need to define the support and confidence and also generate the public key (k2)and private key (k1) used in encryption and decryption in protocol and finally compute the final results. The data mining combiner responsible of combining the results of clients sites and mix the results to make better privacy of user data and every client is responsible of making the LDM and encrypt the results of mining and send to data mining combiner.
One of the most features of our implantation that our implementation can be extended to any number of sites without modifies the implementation. But in old algorithm to add any new site we need to change the implementation to be extended for this new site. In our implementation our test in data that represent based on 0/1 matrix. And using public-key cryptography as in Rivest et al. (1978) , where each user places in a public file an encryption Procedure E. That is, the public file is a directory giving the encryption procedure of each user. The user keeps secret the details of his corresponding decryption Procedure D. There are several examples of commutative encryption; perhaps the most famous being RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) (if keys are not shared) and Pohlig-Hellman encryption. We use RSA that is useful to fulfil our requirements.
Simulation environment and results of proposed method
This section shows the results of proposed algorithm versus the algorithm (Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien, 2007) . The following describes simulation environment used in evaluating proposed algorithm.
Simulation environment
Section 3 shows the evaluation metrics that are used in evaluating new algorithm. To perform these evaluation metrics, an implementation of proposed and old algorithm are performed using java. Also, a simulation environment is used for testing this algorithm.
Because the distributed association rules mining needs the mining to run in more than one site. Remote method invocation (RMI) is used to allow all sites to communicate with each other. The simulation environment has some controlling variables to appear as the real cases as the following, and as shown in Table 1 for horizontally partitioned database: Number of rows 500 5,000 10,000 50,000 10,000
• Database size: the database is as 0/1 matrix with suitable number of columns and rows for testing algorithms for vertically, horizontally and mixed partitioned data. For horizontally partitioned database, database sizes of 2,500, 25,000, 50,000, 250,000 and 2,500,000 bytes are used, the extension of these sizes is in the number of rows. In vertically partitioned database, databases sizes of 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 and 50,000 bytes are used and extension of these sizes is in the number of columns. Finally, for mixed partitioned databases the used sizes were 30, 50, 70, 100, 150, and 200 KB.
• Mining parameters: association rule mining is used so the control parameters of the mining process are support and confidence. Default values for testing were used as 40 for support 60 for confidence.
• Number of tests: number of times any algorithm is tested. Ten times are used and then the averages of these ten tests were taken for each database size.
Results of proposed method
By running the new algorithm is tested 75 times, and 75 times for old algorithm. On five homogenous databases with different size from 2,500 bytes to 2,500,000 bytes by 15 times for every database. The 15 values are much closed to each other. The values listed in Table 2 (Schoeman, 1984) are the average values. Testing is performed using P4 (2.8 GHZ) with Java (SDK 1.6). Figure 8 Show graphically percentage time comparison of our method and old one.
To measure the rule quality we implement the FDM (Cheung et al., 1996a) and make some tests in this algorithm related to our algorithm as in Table 3 . We use different database size 2500, 2500, 50000, 250,000 bytes when number of attributes is 50 and 2,500,000 bytes when number of attributes is 250, confidence = 60 and support = 40. From the results we can find that new algorithm has a high performance in computations, communications time and accuracy than the algorithm in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) . This due to the total bit-communication cost for our algorithm is function in (N) site, but the algorithm in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) is function in (N 2 ) sites. In the same time based on proofing for privacy preserving our algorithm preserves the privacy also. New algorithm is more flexible to extend it to any number of sites without any change in implementation. And also any increase does not add more time to algorithm because all client sites perform the mining in the same time so the overhead in communication time only. Also one of the interesting features of this new algorithm is that using Apriori-Tid no need for the database to count the support of any frequent item set after the first pass. New algorithm computes frequent item sets and local support at the same time. Table 4 shows a comparison of our algorithm with respect to algorithms in Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) and in Estivill-Castro and Hajyasien (2007) . Table 4 Comparison among algorithm in Kantarcioglu and Clifton (2004) 
Conclusions
In this paper we presented privacy preserving association rule mining algorithms of have been recently introduced with the aim of preventing the discovery of sensible information. We modify an algorithm of privacy preserving association rule mining on distributed homogenous data by optimise the communication between sites, modify the mining algorithm and how compute the distributed association rule mining. This modification for the algorithm of computing the distributed association rule mining to preserve the privacy of users. Also an implementation for modified algorithm is presented. From the results obtained we can say that our algorithm is good privacy preserving algorithm and preserve the accuracy with high performance. Our algorithm is more flexible to extend to any number of sites without any change in implementation. And also any increase does not add more time to algorithm because all client sites perform the mining in the same time so the overhead in communication time only. The total bit-communication cost for our algorithm is function in (N) sites. Our protocol is base in public key cryptography so we use RSA as example for testing of our algorithm. For future work we can replace it with strong public key cryptography.
